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Abstract: In the classical secretary problem the decision maker can only observe the relative
ranks of the items presented. Recently, Ferguson - building on ideas of Stewart - showed that,
in a game theoretic sense, 'there is no advantage if the actual values of the random variables
underlying the relative ranks can be observed (game of googol). We extend this to the case
where the number of items is unknown with a known upper bound. Corollary 3 extends one of
the main results in [HK] to all randomized stopping times. We also include a modified, some
what more formal argument for Ferguson's result.

1 Introduction
In an entertaining yet serious article, T. Ferguson [F] recently pursued the question:
Who solved the secretary problem? The first published version of the problem was
described as the (two~person zero-sum) game of googol in Martin Gardner's Februa
ry 1960 column of the Scientific American. Player I chooses n numbers and presents
them one by one in random order to Player II, who may stop whenever he pleases,
and wins if the last number observed is the largest of all the numbers. In contrast to
the usual treatment of the secretary problem, Player II can see the actual numbers
presented to him and not just their relative ranks.
It follows from results of Samuels [S] that the lower value of the game of goo
gol is equal to the value qJ" that can be obtained by considering only the relative
ranks. On the other hand, Ferguson showed that, for any e > 0, Player I has a stra
tegy for choosing the numbers Xl, ... , X" which guarantees that Player II cannot
succeed with probability larger than qJ" + e. Thus, the value of the game of googol
exists and equals qJn. Ferguson used a class of distributions for Xl> ... ,X"' already
employed by Berezovskiy and Gnedin [BG] to derive a result similar to that of Sa
muels.
In a recent article [HK] the present authors studied the secretary problem when
the number of items presented is a random variable N with an unknown distribution
but with known upper bound n. The least favorable distribution for N and the (ranThe first author was supported in part by NSF Grant DMS-89-01267.
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domized) minimax optimal strategy for Player II observing only the relative ranks
were determined. In the present paper it is shown that the advantage which Player II
might have from using the Xi instead of the ranks is, again, arbitrarily small, if
Player I uses the distributions proposed by Berezovskiy and Gnedin for the Xi' and,
independently, the least favorable distribution of N.

2 Fixed Number of Observations
The main purpose of this section is to record some known results on the secretary
problem and the game of googol and some modifications, simplifications and exten
sions (to include ties and randomized stopping). The present variants will be needed
in §3.
Let us start with a discussion of randomized stopping times. If Sf c 3; c ... is
an increasing sequence of a-algebras in a probability space (0, 9; P), ~ shall de
note the a-algebra generated by the union of the Yrs. By enlarging the underlying
probability space, if necessary, it may be assumed that there exists a sequence of
independent random variables U1, Uz, •.. independent of ~, and having uniform
distribution in [0, 1].
Following [PS], we call a random variable t with values in {I, 2, ... } u {oo} a
randomized stopping time of (.9;;") if for each m = I, 2,
the event {t > m} and the
a-algebra Sf.: are conditionally independent given ~ 9,..{(~» denotes the family
of randomized stopping times for (~), and Y«.9;;",» denotes the family of stopping
times for (~).
If q = (qlt qz, ...) is a sequence of [0, 1]-values random variables such that qm is
~-measurable for each m, a randomized stopping tq is given by

We have

Pitman and Speed [PS] have sketched an argument showing that (for large enough
probability spaces) any randomized stopping time t can be represented "isomorphi
cally" as above: if tE 3;"(~» is given, put (taking 0/0 = 1)
qm=P(t=m I ~)IP(t??m I ~).

(2.1)

Then the randomized stopping times t q and t have the same conditional distribution
given ~. Hence, we can replace t by t q in any stopping problem with Sf.:-measura
ble reward Zm for stopping at time m without changing the expected reward.
For finite sequences Sf C ... c .9;;", these definitions and remarks must be mod
ified in the obvious way; for example, .9;;" replaces ~.
For a finite sequence X = (Xit ••• ,Xn ) of random variables taking values in a
totally ordered set, and 1::;; i::;; m, let

denote the relative rank of X j in XI> .. . ,Xm;

(c~lfd A

is the number of elements of

A).

If 9;, is the a-algebra generated by XI> ... , X m, we write ,9'""(or ,9'""(X) for
,9'""«~» and g; (or g;(X» for g;«~». If :9'm is the a-algebra generated by
R1,m, ... ,Rm. m, then :9'mc :9'm+I' We write ,9'""(R) or ,9'""(R(X) for ,9'""«:9'm» and
g;(R) or g;(R (X» for g;« :9'm»' Note that :9'm C 9;" and hence ,9'""(R) C ,9'""(X) and
g;(R) C g;(X).
We shall also need the random variables Mi=Mj(X) = max(Xh ••. , Xi)'

In the classical formulation of the secretary problem (see Ferguson [F]), it is
usually assumed that Xl> ... , X n is a random permutation of a set of n distinct real
numbers, that is, X ll ••• , X n are exchangeable with

The objective is to find a stopping time tE ,9'""(R) based only on the relative ranks for
which P(Xt=Mn ) is as large as possible. In this case (without ties) the optimal
stopping rule in is well known and is obtained as follows.
Set So = 0 and for j~ 1, Sj = 1:1= 1 i-I, and let k n be the nonnegative integer sa
tisfying

(2.2)
Then the stopping time in given by

in = min {n, min {j>kn:J0~Xi for all i<j}}
=

(2.3)

min {n, min {j> kn:Rj,j = 1}}

is optimal, even over the class ,9,1R) of randomized stopping times based on the
ranks, that is
P(X1 =Mn) = sup P(X,=Mn).
n

tE

(2.4)

.9';(R)

As long as there are no ties, the value in (2.4) does not depend on the (exchangeable)
distribution of XI> ... , Xn> and, as in Ferguson [FI, will be denoted by rpn.
The next proposition extends the minimax version of (2.4) slightly to include the
possibility of ties. It is vaguely hinted at, although not explicitly stated or proved, in
Campbell [C}. Let· W denote the family of all exchangeable sequences
X = (X ll

••. ,

X n).

Proposition 2.1: There exists a randomized stopping rule

f~E g;(R)

such that
(2.5)

holds jor all exchangeable sequences XI' ... , X n • Hence

inf

sup P(Xt=Mn)=fPn= sup

Xe!if te.57;(R)

inf P(Xt=Mn).

te.57;(R) Xe!if

Proof' Let XI> ... , X n be exchangeable. Enlarging the probability space, if neces
sary, let UI> U2 , ••• , Un be iid random variables with uniform distribution in [0, I],
independent of XI> ... , X n. Put Xi= (Xi> Ui), and write Xj-<Xj if either Xi<~' or
Xi = X j and Ui <~. The process X' = (Xl, X 2, ... , X~) is exchangeable and almost
surely has no ties. The stopping time
l~ =

min {n, min {j>kn:Ri.j(X') = I}}

is a randomized stopping time based on the ranks of the X/s, that is, it belongs to
Y;:(R(X». It does not depend on the distribution of Xl' ... , X n. If Xj(w) is maximal
among Xl (w), ... , X~(w), then Xi(w) =Mn(X)(w), so (2.5) holds. The second asser
tion follows from the first by using (2.4) and considering sequences Xl, ... , X n
which have almost surely no ties.
0
The next objective will be to apply ideas of Stewart [St], Berezovskiy, Gnedin,
and Ferguson to show that even if Player II can use stopping times based on the
actual values of the process, as opposed to just their relative ranks, in general he can
still not improve his probability fPn of winning by more than e.
Let I(A) denote the indicator function of a set A. U(a, b) denotes the uniform
distribution in the interval [a, b]. Recall that the Pareto distribution with parameters
a > 0 and m > 0 is the distribution on IR. with density
g«(} I a, m) = amO'.(} -(0'.+ 1) I«(}> m).
Definition 2.2: An (n + I)-dimensional random vector (e, Xl> ... , X n) is said to be
PaU(a, m, n)-distributed if: (i)
has a Pareto distribution with parameters a> 0,
m>O and (ii) given e=(}, the random variables Xl> ,,,,Xn are iid U(O, (}).

e

Lemma 2.3: If (O, Xl> ... , X n) is PaU(a, m, n), then (i) XI> X 2 , ••• , X n are ex
changeable with P(Xi=~for some ii=J)=O, and (ii) the conditional distribution of
(e, X j + lo ••• , X n ) given Xl = XI> ... , Xj=Xj is PaU(a+j, mj, n-J), where
mj=max(m, XI>" .,x).
Proof' (i) is clear from the definition of PaU(a, m, n). To see (ii), first observe that
the joint density of 0, Xl> ... , X n is

so the joint density of (O, X 2 ,

••• ,

X n) given Xl

= Xl>

fX l (0, X2, ... , x n), is

where m ' = max (Xl , m). But (2.6) is the density of PaU(a+ I, m ', n-I). Now (ii)
follows easily by induction.
0

The next proposition is a result of Ferguson inspired by ideas of Stewart; the
present proof is partly a simplification and partly of formalization of his argument,
filling a small gap. (The argument that one can work with unconditional expecta
tions in the backward induction is not given in [Fl. It appears, in different form, in
{BG]).

Proposition 2.4: Given e>O there exists 0'>0 (close to 0) so that if (O, Xl> ... , X n) is
PaU(O', 1, n), then
P(Xt =Mn) $ 'Pn + e for all tE 3;(X).
Proof: Let Wj=I(X;=Mn), and Wt=I(Xj=M~) where M1=max(I,M;),
(i= 1, ... , n). Then W1 = W;I(maxi:sn X;~ 1). Let Sfdenote the a-algebra generated
by XI' "" Xi' and let

Then Yi =P(M1=Mn I Sf) on {Xi=Mt}, and=O otherwise. Note that m is a scale
parameter for the Pareto distribution, that is 0 is Pa(O', m) if and only if 01m is
Pa(O', 1), and hence m is also a scale parameter for the PaU(O', m, n) distribution.
Fix e>O, and let (O, Xl> ... , X n) be PaU(a, 1, n) where 0'>0 is chosen so small
that

(2.7)
By Lemma 2.3 (ii), the conditional dsitribution of (O, XJ+ I, .. " X n ) given
X" ..., X j depends only on MY, and, by scale-invariance the distribution of

given Mj = mj is PaU(a + j, 1, n - J)' Hence,
(0,

XJ+ I,

••• ,

Xn)/Mj is independent of XI' ... , X j •

Thus P(Mj =M~ I Sf) is constant, and, of course,
c(j) =P(Mj =M~), 1 $j$n, it is easy to see that

=P(Mj =M~). Letting

0<c(l)<c(2)< ... <c(n)= 1.

Next, define t* E 9'(X) by backward induction as follows. Let t* (n) = n, and if
t*U+ 1) has been defined for somej<n, set
t*(j) =

[j

if Yj~E(Yt*u+I)I Sf)
t* U + 1) otherwise.

Then t*{l) is the stopping time in Y(X) which maximizes E(Yt)=E(Wn. Let
Yj=E(Yt*U) I 5f-J), j= 1, ... , n, (where st is the trivial a-algebra). By (2.8)
Yrr=P(X,,~M~-I I Sf-I) is constant, and since (O, X" ..., X,,) is PaU, Yn>O.
Assume it has been shown that all Yj with j ~ i + 1 are constant. Then
Yj=E(Yt*U» for j~i+ 1, and hence O<y,,::SY"_I::5 ... :::;Yi+I'
If e(l) < Yi+}, then Yi assumes only values smaller than Yi+ 1 and hence
t* (I) == t* (i + 1) and Yi = Yi +} is constant. On the other hand, if e(l) ~ Yi +" then
t* (l) = i on {Xi = Mn and t* (I) = t* (i + 1) on the complement of this set, in which
case

{Xi=MT} = {Xi >M1-d a.s., so since X/M1-1 is independent of
(Xl> ... , Xi-I) and since {Xi <M1} = {Xi =M1V, it follows that y;is constant. This
implies that all Yi are constant.
The monotonicity e{l)<c(2)< ... <c(n) and Y}~Y2~'" ~Y" together imply
that there exists an r such that

But

t*(l)=min {n, min {i~r:Xi=MT}}.

Define tyE Y(R) by
t r = min {n, min {i~r:Xi=M;}} ==min {n, min {i~r:Ri,i== I}}.

Since P(Xi=Xj for some i':!=J) ==0, it follows by (2.4) and the definition of ({J" that
E(WtJ:::; ({J". Since tT is optimal for the process (W1), E(W~*(l)~E(W~) for all
tE g-(X). On {X} ~ I}, t r agrees with t* (1) and Wi agrees with W1 for all i. There
fore, for every tE Y(X), it follows by (2.7) that
P(Xt == M,,) == E( Wt) ~E( W~) + e/2 ::sE(W~*(l) + e/2
::sE(Wt*(l)I(XI ~
+ e =E(W,) + e
::S({Jn+ e.

1»

Since, for a given sequence X" ... , X", there is, for any t' E 3;(X), a tE Y(X) with
P(Xt==Mn)~P(Xt'==M,,), this completes the proof.
0
The next theorem generalizes Ferguson's [F) result mainly in that ties (and ran
domized stopping times) are allowed:
Theorem 2.5:

inf sup P(Xt==M,,)=({Jn= sup inf P(Xt==M,,).
XE g'tE.9;(x)

tE.9;(X)XE g'

Proof: As 3;(X) :J 3;(R) both the left-hand side and the right-hand side are ~ ({In by
Proposition 2.1. Proposition 2.4 shows that the left-hand side is ::s ({In' A fortiori the
0
right-hand side is '5, ({J".

3 Random Number of Observations
We now turn to the situation in which the number N of observable random variables
Xi can be random, and the observer does not know the distribution of N. N is as
sumed bounded with a known upper bound n.
In a game theoretic description, Player I chooses a random number N with
1 sN s n, and given N = j he chooses real-valued exchangeable random variables
Xl> ... ,~. Player II can look at the values of Xl> X z, •.. successively until he de
cides to stop (or until he notices that there are no further observations available). If
he stops at time t = i, his reward is

where MN=max{Xl> ... , X N }. On {N<i}, Xi need not be defined, yet Vj=O is
well-defined on this set.
Let Sf denote the a -algebra generated by the sets {N 2::j} n {Xj s U}, j s i,
UEIR, and g; the a-algebra generated by the sets {N2::m} n {Rj.m=i}, jsmsi,
1 sf Sm. Using these a-algebras, Y(X), 3;"(X), Y(R) , and 3;"(R) are defined as
above.
Any sequence (ql>"" q7l) with qiE[O, 1] (1 sisn) determines a tE3;"(R) as fol
lows. For 1 sis n -1, t stops at time i if t did not stop earlier, R i. i = 1 and Ui 2:: qi'
Let Y~ (R) denote the class of randomized stopping rules of this form. Identifying
the vector and the stopping time determined by it, we can write t=(q1> ,... Q7l)' Let
g'* denote the class of all random vectors (N, X) = (N, Xl, ... , X N ) as above without
ties (P(Nsj, Xi=Xj for some i<j) =0).
We now recall the main results of [HK] needed below. Let CX I = 1, CXz = 112, and
for n>2

with k71 and

Let

P~ =

Sj

as in (2.2). Let

t~ = (qT, ... , q~) E Y~ (R)

(P!, ... , p~) be the probability vector with
CX7lu +n)-1

pj

be defined by

=

(

cx7l(l-(S7I-I-Skn-l)-I)

o

forj<k71
for j=k71
for kn<j<n.

Theorem B in [HK] asserts: E(Vt .)2::cx71 for all (N, X)E g'*. TheoremC in [HK] as
serts: If (N, X)E g'* and p(N=j)n=pj (1 sjsn) then E(Vt )scx71 for all tE Y~(R).

Note that Theorem B extends to the case with ties by the device of Proposition
2.1. Clearly, Theorem C does not extend to distributions with ties. One might have
Xl = X 2 = ... = X N • Then t == 1 is a stopping time with E (Vt ) = 1.
We can now state the principal result of this paper.

Theorem 3.1: Assume P(N=j)=pj U=I, ... ,n). Let (0,X h . . . ,Xn ) be
PaV(Cf., 1, n) and independent of N. For any 8>0, if Cf.>0 is sufficiently small
then
(3.1)

Remark: It is convenient to define X], ... , X n on all of 0, although only Xl> ... , X N
can be observed.
Before we begin with the proof, let us record two consequences of Theorem
3.1.
Corollary 3.2: The value of the above game exists and equals Cf. n •
Proof' For any 8> 0, Player I can make sure that E (Vt ) ~ Cf. n + e by choosing (N, X)
as in Theorem 3.1. On the other hand, Theorem B and its extension to the case with
ties imply that Player II can win at least with probability Cf. n •
0
The next corollary strengthens Theorem C since

g-~ (R)

c

Y;(R).

Corollary 3.3: If (N, X)e fg. satisfies P(N=J)=pj, 1 $j~n, then E(Vt ) $. an for all
temR).
Proof' Given {N=j} the distribution of the ranks does not depend on the specific
distribution of (Xl' ... , X;.) as long as there are no ties.
0
Proof of Theorem 3.1: Let

M~

= max (M;, 1) and

V~ =I(X;=M"tJ)I(N~i).

We want to show that for sufficiently small Cf. > 0

E(Vn$.Cf.n +e/2 for all teY;(X).

(3.2)

If a>O is small, (2.7) holds, and (3.1) follows from (3.2). Let teY;(x) be given.
Define (q], "0' qn) by (2.1), and set

By [PS], t and t q have the same conditional distribution given 9;;. (As the sequence
is finite, we can replace .9; by ~.) Hence
E(Vn=E(V~),

and we can assume t = t q • We can also assume qn == 1 and for i::; n-l
{q; > O} C {X; = MT} n {N:::: i}, since no reward is paid after time n, and V1 = 0 on
the complement of {X;=Mn n {N::::i}. The plan is to deduce Theorem 3.1 from
Theorem C via some changes of the stopping time.
Let !il;' denote the a-algebra generated by Xl> ... , X;. On {N::::i}, !il;' coin
cides with Sf. As q; is 3f-measurable, there exists a measurable function
h;:IR;~[O, 1] with q;=h;(Xl> ... ,X;) on {N::::i}. Now let qj=h;(XI> ... ,X;) on 'l,
and

t'=tq , is a randomized stopping time for (Sf'). As V1=0 on {N<i}, we have
E(V!) =E(V'D. Note that
q~==1

and {t/;>O} C {X;=Mn (i=l, ... ,n-I).

(3.3)

Next, we want to replace t' by a stopping time f = t q E 9;( Sf') where
qj=p;!(X;=M1)

0= I, ... , n-l)

with P; E [0, 1] and qn == 1. We shall show that this can be done without changing the
expected reward. The sequence Pl> ... , Pn-I is determined by Pn= 1 and (again tak
ing 0/0= I)
E(I(XI :::: l)qD
PI =
P(X1 :::: 1)
E(qiI(t'>i-I)I(X;::::M1_1»
P; = E(I(t'>i-l)I(X;::::M1_1»

0=2, ... , n-l).

Lemma 3.4: P(f=j) =P(t' =J), j= 1, ... , n.
Proof:
P(f = 1)=P(X1:::: I, q;:::: U1) =E(/(X1:::: l)qD
= PIP(XI:::: 1) =E(/(X1 :::: I)ql) =P(f= I).

Note that {X;::::Mt-d is independent of :Tf-l' When the assertion has been
proved for j::; i-I, we obtain
P(t' =i)=E(/(t'>i -1)qiI(X;::::M1_1»
=p;E(I(t'>i-I)/(Xj ::::M1_1»
=p;P(t'>i-l)P(X;::::M1_1)
= p;P(f> i -1)P(X;::::M1_1)
=E(p;!(i>i -1, X;::::M1-1»
=P(i= I).

o

Lemma 3.5: For jsi
E(I«('=j, N=i) V1)=E(I(f=j, N=z) V1).

Proof: On {t ' = j}, X j

=

M1.

Hence

E(I(t/=j, N= i) V1)=E(I«(1 =j, N=i, M1 =Mn
=p1E(I«(/=j, M1=Mn)
=p1E(IW=j)E(I(M1=M1) IX1o

. . . ,Xj ,

U 10

... ,

UJ).

Now note that E(I(M1 =Mn I X 10 ••• , X j , U10 ••• , ~) is a constant pU, 1) by (2.8).
The same calculations hold with f replacing t. Hence the lemma follows from Lem
ma 3.4.
0
It now follows that

E(V1)=E(Vn.

Now assume that (3.2) fails and a>O is so small that P(X1 < l)se/4. There exists
te~(X) with E(Vn>a n +el2. Let lbe the stopping time ti} with

On {Xl ~ I}, 1 coincides with f and V1 with Vi (i= I, ... , n). Hence E(Vf)~an +e/4.
But le.7~ (R) and the distribution of (N, X) belongs to W*, which via Theorem C
of [HK] contradicts the assumption that (3.2) fails, thereby completing the proof.

o
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